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The Impact of EU Regional Support on Growth
and Convergence in the European Union*
Abstract
The evidence presented in this article suggests that EU regional support has a signifi-
cant and positive impact on the growth performance of European regions. Moreover,
there are signs of a change in the impact of this support in the 1990s, indicating that
the major reform of the structural funds undertaken in 1988 may have succeeded in
making EU regional policy more effective. However, the results also indicate that
the economic effects of such support are much stronger in more developed environ-
ments, emphasizing the importance of accompanying policies that improve the com-
petence of the receiving environments.
Introduction
Greater equality across Europe in productivity and income has been one of
the central goals of the European Community since the early days of Euro-
pean economic integration, and various policy measures have been introduced
to help achieve this goal (the ‘structural funds’). For a long time it appeared
as if the regions of Europe were on a converging path and, hence, that the
existing policies had the desired effect (e.g. Molle, 1980). More recent evi-
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dency towards convergence came to a halt in the beginning of the 1980s (Neven
and Gouyette, 1995; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996). In the decade that fol-
lowed, very little regional convergence occurred within individual EU Mem-
ber States (Cappelen et al., 1999; Commission 1996, 2001). To the extent that
there has been any convergence, it appears to have been mainly at the country
level (catch-up by the southern member countries that joined the Union in the
1980s). These findings beg new questions about the effectiveness of existing
policies.
 The EU structural funds went through a major reform in 1988. The objec-
tive was to make the funds more effective in reducing the gap between ad-
vanced and less-advanced regions, and strengthening economic and social
cohesion in the European Community. The financial resources allocated to
these funds were also significantly increased. The reform of European re-
gional policy, the increase in the budget and the recent slowdown of conver-
gence all underline the need for a thorough assessment of the policy out-
comes. The current enlargement of the European Union, and the possible role
that regional policy may play in an enlarged Union, further underline the
need for an improved understanding of how these policies work and what the
long-run effects are.
So far, such assessment has been mainly descriptive (e.g. Commission,
1997; Bachtler and Turok, 1997; Heinelt and Smith, 1996; Staeck, 1996), or
based on simulations of large macroeconomic models (Commission, 1999,
2001). The first approach consists primarily of outlining what type of invest-
ments have been made using the funds, as well as examining the characteris-
tics and performance of the regions that have received the investments. While
such a descriptive undertaking certainly yields useful insights into the work-
ing of policy, and helps us to distinguish between successful and unsuccess-
ful cases, it cannot be seen as evidence of causality. Moreover, in most cases
the sample of regions included in such analyses is too small to warrant any
general conclusions. The second approach, i.e. macroeconomic simulation,
has the advantage of providing more exact estimates of the growth effects of
regional support. However, such estimates are arrived at in an indirect man-
ner (as a shift in investment, for instance), rather than as an assessment of the
direct outcome of changes in specific policies or support schemes. Further-
more, the estimates thus obtained depend crucially on the specific assump-
tions on which the model is based. Hence, it is possible that the results that
come out of such simulations may depend more on the hypotheses underlying
the model than on, say, what happens to regional support schemes.
In this article, we will try to estimate the long-run effects of European
regional support through the structural funds in a more direct manner, with
particular emphasis on the extent to which the 1988 reform has succeeded in623
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making European regional policy more effective. In previous work, we have
shown that differences in economic growth across European regions can be
reasonably well explained by an approach that focuses on innovation activi-
ties in the region, the potential for exploiting technologies developed else-
where and complementary factors affecting the exploitation of this potential
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996; Fagerberg et al., 1997; Cappelen et al., 1999).
What we will do in this article is to include regional support through the
structural funds in an analysis of growth and convergence in the European
Union in the 1980s and 1990s, based on this approach. In this way we will be
able to make a joint assessment of the impact of regional support and other
growth-enhancing (or growth-retarding) factors at the regional level.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section I we present new evi-
dence on growth and convergence in the European Union in the 1980s and
1990s. The analysis confirms that there is more convergence at the national
level (between countries) than at the regional level (within countries), and
more for a group of EU member countries that includes the entrants of the
early to mid-1980s than for the narrower group of countries that had joined
earlier. In Section II we present some statistics on EU regional support for our
sample of regions in the same period. It is shown that the degree of support
has increased significantly over time. However, the allocation of such sup-
port does to some extent depend on factors that may have an effect on re-
gional growth independently of the support itself, and this arguably compli-
cates the analysis. We discuss the implications of that in Section III, which
presents the model to be used in the analysis, and considers how it may be
applied to the existing data.
For example, the theory argues that lagging regions may have a high po-
tential for growth due to a backlog of technological knowledge developed in
advanced regions. However, because the lagging regions are also the regions
that receive most support from European sources, it may be difficult to sepa-
rate the effects of ‘catching-up’ and regional support. We suggest that choos-
ing an estimation method that combines cross-sectional and time-series infor-
mation may reduce these problems. Section IV presents the results. These
indicate that EU regional support has a significant and positive impact on the
growth performance of European regions. Moreover, there are signs of a change
in the impact of this support in the 1990s, indicating that the major reform of
the structural funds that was undertaken in 1988 may have succeeded in mak-
ing EU regional policy more effective. The results also indicate that the eco-
nomic effects of such support are much stronger in more developed regions,
emphasizing the importance of the receptiveness of the receiving environ-
ments. The final section concludes and discusses the implications for policy.624 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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I. Regional Convergence?
It is by now well established that the distribution of regional incomes per
capita in Europe became more equal after the Second World War (Molle,
1980; Molle and Cappellin, 1988). However, this convergence in regional
incomes seems to have slowed or come to halt after 1980 (Fagerberg and
Verspagen, 1996; Cappelen et al., 1999). This is especially the case for the
countries that were already members in the 1970s. But, during the 1980s,
three relatively poor southern European countries joined the Union and, as
might be expected, this led to changes in the European growth pattern (in-
cluding convergence). More recently the EU has been enlarged by three rela-
tively rich countries (Austria, Finland and Sweden) as well as a relatively
poor one (Eastern Germany), and this may also have affected European growth
and the regional distribution of income in the EU.
This shows that, when studying dispersion of regional incomes in the EU
over time, it is important to adjust for significant changes in the number of
regions within the EU. We have chosen to confine our study to the countries
that comprised the Union before the entrance of new members in the 1990s
(with a definition of Germany that is nearly identical to the previous Western
Germany). However, due to a lack of regionalized data, we were not able to
include the three smallest EU member countries: Denmark, Ireland and Lux-
embourg.1 Regions are defined at the NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 level depending on
availability of other types of data needed in the empirical analysis. Where we
include NUTS 1 regions, these are generally comparable in size to the NUTS
2 regions we use. Incomes are made comparable by using current purchasing
power parities (based on ESA952).
 Table 1 presents an overview of the dispersion of GDP per capita in the
European Union for selected years between 1980 and 1997. Two different
measures are included, the (regional) standard deviation for Europe as a whole,3
and the regional standard deviation within countries4 (i.e. adjusted for cross-
country differences in GDP per capita).5 The former is a measure of the de-
1 These three countries would in any case have entered as single regions but since, as is customary in
econometric analyses on pooled cross-country data sets, we use country-specific dummy variables to
account for the impact of possible unidentified country-specific factors, most of the growth of these
countries would by definition be accounted for by these dummies.
2 European System of Accounts (ESA, 1995); Eurostat, Luxembourg (1996). Hence these data are not
directly comparable to the data we have used previously (e.g. Cappelen et al., 1999).
3 The regional standard deviation is calculated as the standard deviation of the log of relative regional GDP
per capita (regional GDP per capita divided by the EU average for the same year).
4 Standard deviation within countries is calculated as the standard deviation of the log of relative regional
GDP per capita (regional GDP per capita divided by the country average for the same year).
5 To the extent that commuting across regional borders is frequent (living in one region and working in
another), GDP per capita numbers may present a biased picture of income and/or productivity. The
European Commission (2001) argues that ‘problems of commuting … are significant only in a few cases’
(p. 10). Anyway, as long as this phenomenon does not change much over time, it will not invalidate the
analysis presented below of the changes in regional dispersion.625
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gree of regional dispersion in the EU as a whole (irrespective of which coun-
try the region belongs to), the latter indicates to what extent the change in the
former reflects changes in dispersion between regions within individual mem-
ber countries (the measures are normalized so that the numbers are compara-
ble across years). We present indices of regional dispersion for three different
samples, the total sample, the sample used in the econometric analyses pre-
sented later in this article (actual sample), and a reduced sample that excludes
the three Southern member countries that joined during the 1980s. The total
sample contains all regions from the nine countries included in our investiga-
tion, and the actual sample is slightly smaller due to lack of data for certain
regions for some of the variables included in the econometric analysis pre-
sented in Section III.6
The table shows that regional dispersion for the sample as a whole changed
very little between 1980 and 1990. But there appears to have been a decrease
in regional dispersion (i.e. convergence) after 1990. However, this does not
hold if the three new southern members are excluded from the sample. In
fact, in this case there appears to be a slight trend towards increased differ-
ences – or divergence – over time. Moreover it does not apply to dispersion
within countries (irrespective of whether the three new entrants are included
or not). Hence, these numbers show that the decrease in regional dispersion
for the sample as a whole after 1990 is entirely accounted for by the catch-up
of the three new member countries towards the European level. Within coun-
tries there is, on average, no convergence.7
Table 1: Dispersion of Regional GDP per Capita in Europe, 1980–97
                                                              1980               1985    1990      1997
Total sample (105 regions)
   Standard deviation (std.) 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.27
   Std. within countries 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Actual sample (95 regions)
   Standard deviation (std.) 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.28
   Std. within countries 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
Actual sample less Greece, Portugal
   and Spain
   Standard deviation (std.) 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24
   Std. within countries 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21
Note: GDP figures based on current PPS (ESA95).
6 The difference in sample size consists of the Dutch regions and some individual regions from other
countries (see the Appendix for details).
7 See also the analysis of this issue in Commission (2001), which also points out that there is little, if any,
convergence across regions within individual EU member countries. However, the analysis presented here626 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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II. EU Regional Support
How is this to be explained, given the quite extensive regional support schemes
at work in Europe aimed at fostering regional convergence? As an introduc-
tion to the econometric analysis that follows, we will in this section present
some key information on EU regional support for the sample of regions cov-
ered by our analysis.
Until the 1970s, regional policy8 in Europe was a domestic matter. How-
ever, several factors (including the proposed enlargement to include the UK
and Ireland and contemporary initiatives for a deepening of European inte-
gration), led to a greater focus on regional policy at the European level, and in
1975 a separate fund (ERDF – the European regional development fund) was
created to help alleviate the principal regional imbalances within the Com-
munity. Although modest at first, EU regional support through the structural
funds has grown in importance over the years and today is one of the key
policy areas in the European Union. An important step in that process came in
1988 when the structural funds went through a major reform following the
enlargement of the Community to include three relatively poor countries from
the south (and the plans for ‘a single market’). The main objective of the
reform was to make the funds more effective in reducing the gap between
advanced and less-advanced regions, and strengthening economic and social
cohesion in the Community. The financial resources allocated to these funds
were also significantly increased. In this new system, several ‘objectives’ were
formulated. For the purpose of this article, three of these objectives are of
special importance:
• objective 1, aimed at regions lagging behind in terms of GDP per capita,
defined as regions with GDP per capita lower than 75 per cent of the
Community average;
• objective 2, aimed at regions in industrial decline, as indicated by (high)
unemployment and (low) employment growth;
• objective 5b, aimed at rural and agricultural regions, as indicated by the
share of employment in agriculture and GDP per capita.
The other objectives (3 and 4 aimed at unemployment, and 5a aimed at com-
mon agricultural policy) cannot easily be attributed to individual regions, and
will not be taken into account here. Thus the analysis that follows considers
 covers a longer time span (1980 compared to 1988 as the starting year). Moreover, we use a consistent
classification of regions, while the EU study uses the NUTS 2 level without adjusting for the changes in
the classification system over time, which implies that they cannot properly distinguish between changes
in dispersion and changes stemming from classification changes (Commission, 2001, Table A3). Hence
the results presented here should be more robust.
8 For analyses of regional policy in the EU, including the background and consequences of its reforms, see
Begg and Mayes (1993), Begg (1997) and Bache and George (2001).627
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only support that can be clearly identified with individual regions and which
may be assumed to have an impact on why growth differs across regions
within a country. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the numbers pre-
sented below aim to illustrate the amount of support that the ‘typical’ region
of our sample(s) receives. Hence, the numbers refer to the average region (the
mean value of the variable for the regions of a country or a group of coun-
tries). These numbers may differ slightly from official statistics for entire
countries or the EU as a whole. For instance, regions that receive extensive
support are often poorer and less populous than those that receive little or no
support, with the consequence that the mean value (over a sample of regions)
of EU regional support as a share of GDP will tend to be slightly higher than
more aggregated statistics (calculated for entire countries or the EU as a
whole).9
Figure 1 gives an indication of the magnitude of regional support to the
average region of our sample before and after the 1988 reform of the funds.
During the period 1980–84 the average region in our sample received Euro-
pean regional support equal to around 0.2–0.3 per cent of its GDP.10 In the
years that followed (1985–87), average regional support increased to 0.4 per
9 Another source of discrepancy lies in missing values for some regions (or countries) included in the more
aggregated statistics.
10 Data for the period 1980–87 include support (paid grants) through the ‘guidance’ part of the European
agricultural guidance and guarantee fund (EAGGF), financing structural adjustments in rural areas, and
the European regional development fund (ERDF), aimed at correcting for the principal regional imbalanc-
es in the Community. The latter (ERDF) was the most important – about five times that of the former.
Figure 1: EU Regional Support as a Percentage of GDP, Average EU Region
Source: Estimates by the authors based on data from Eurostat, Regions, Statistical Yearbook, various
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cent, largely because the Community now had two relatively poor new mem-
bers (Spain and Portugal), who both qualified for extensive regional support.
After the reform (1989–93) the mean support level increased to around 0.6–
0.7 per cent of GDP, i.e. more than twice the level attained a decade earlier. In
1993, a new reform of the structural funds was agreed that increased the level
of support, especially for objective 1 regions. As a result, in the following
years (1994–97), EU regional support as a percentage of GDP approached
1.0 per cent on average. The poorer member countries also benefited from the
cohesion fund, which was agreed in 1992 and became operative in the fol-
lowing year. Support through these funds mostly went to large transport or
environmental projects spanning several regions, and a regional breakdown
is not available. Moreover, compared to other types of regional support, its
magnitude is relatively modest. For instance, for Greece, Portugal and Spain
between 1994 and 1997 (the only countries in our sample eligible for support
through the cohesion fund), EU regional support through objectives 1, 2 and
5b was between six and ten times that of support through the cohesion fund.
Table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of EU regional support across
objectives and countries for the period following the 1988 reform. As the
table shows, during this period objective 1 support was by far the most impor-
tant. The countries that received the largest amount of support (relative to
GDP) were Portugal and Greece, 2.9 per cent and 2.2 per cent of regional
Table 2: EU Regional Support as a per cent of GDP, Average over Regions in our
Sample, 1989–93
                                  Ob. 1    Ob. 2    Ob. 5b   Total EU    National   Private      Sum
Belgium 0.000 0.024 0.004 0.028 0.034 0.010 0.073
Germany 0.000 0.012 0.007 0.020 0.028 0.011 0.059
Greece 2.229 0.000 0.000 2.229 1.136 0.191 3.556
Spain 0.560 0.071 0.037 0.667 0.537 0.306 1.510
France 0.000 0.040 0.041 0.081 0.114 0.072 0.267
Italy 0.434 0.026 0.026 0.484 0.434 0.213 1.131
Netherlands 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.012 0.024 0.005 0.041
Portugal 2.863 0.000 0.000 2.863 1.685 1.346 5.894
UK 0.080 0.073 0.004 0.157 0.164 0.083 0.404
Mean over regions 0.599 0.035 0.021 0.655 0.440 0.205 1.300
Mean over regions,
excl. Greece,
Portugal and Spain 0.139 0.034 0.022 0.194 0.192 0.099 0.485
Source: Calculations by the authors based on data from Commission (1997).629
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GDP, respectively. Spain (0.7 per cent) follows at some distance, then Italy
(0.5 per cent). Thus, it is clear that Southern European regions benefited pro-
portionally more from European regional support than regions in other parts
of Europe.
For this period we also have data on national public and private matching
funds (the columns ‘National’ and ‘Private’). The provision of these funds is
in fact a prerequisite for obtaining structural funds at all. On average, national
public and private matching funds are about as large (in terms of budget) as
the European funding. Public matching funds are about two-thirds of total
matching funds. Although in the present article, we will not explicitly take
into account the role played by the national public and private matching funds,
it is worth noticing that such matching funds are indeed important for recent
EU regional policy, as one of the main purposes of the 1988 reform was to
strengthen the co-ordination between the regional policy of the Member States
and the EU structural funds on long-term plans and objectives.
How ‘tight’ is the connection between the criteria underlying the various
objectives and the actual distribution of funds across regions? This is an inter-
esting question in itself, but in this article it takes on added significance be-
cause, as pointed out previously, some of those criteria reflect economic vari-
ables that may affect growth independently of the support. To explore this
connection in more detail, we performed a cluster analysis with the explana-
tory variables that we will use in later sections (see Section III) as the inputs.
These were:
• industrial structure (the shares of employment in agriculture and industry,
respectively, in total employment);
• long-term unemployment as a share of the total labour force;
• physical infrastructure (kilometres of motorways per square kilometre);
• population density (the number of inhabitants per square kilometre);
• GDP per capita in the initial year; and the
• R&D intensity, defined as business enterprise R&D personnel as a per-
centage of total employment.
European regional support was broken down by objective (1, 2, 5b) in this
analysis. We arbitrarily fixed the number of clusters to five, and applied a so-
called K-means clustering algorithm. All variables were standardized before
entering in the clustering algorithm.
We obtained one small cluster of two regions, to be disregarded in the
following, and four larger clusters. The characteristics of the four larger clus-
ters are documented in Table 3. Note that because the data were standardized,
a value of zero corresponds to the sample mean, and plus (minus) one corre-
sponds to one standard deviation above (below) the mean. Cluster 1 is a clus-630 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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ter of 19 rich regions that receive little regional support from EU sources. We
label these the ‘little support’ cluster. These regions do a lot of R&D and have
a well-developed infrastructure. Unemployment is low. Cluster 2 is the polar
case. It consists of 34 poor regions that receive relatively high Objective 1
support. These regions are largely agricultural, with a low level of R&D, but
a high level of unemployment. The two remaining clusters (3 and 4) both
have medium income. Cluster 3 is a small one (10 regions) characterized by a
very high level of objective 2 support, and relatively high objective 5b sup-
port. As might be expected by the nature of objective 2 support, these regions
have relatively large manufacturing sectors. The final cluster (4), labelled
‘intermediate’, is a group of peripheral regions, characterized by relatively
poor infrastructure and low population density, but with a level of income
that on average is too high to attract much objective 1 support. However,
these regions do attract some objective 5b support.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the three forms of European re-
gional support that we distinguish after the 1988 reform are clearly aimed at
different types of regions. One can indeed speak of a ‘typical objective 1
region’, and the same holds to some extent for the two other objectives. Hence
the connection between the official criteria and the actual distribution is rela-
tively ‘tight’. As mentioned above, this makes it more difficult to estimate the
impact of the support, since the variables that these criteria reflect may affect
growth independently of the support. However, before we discuss the impli-
cations of this further, we need to present our explanatory framework and
consider how the variables mentioned above fit into that.
Table 3: A Cluster Analysis of European Regions 1989–93
                                                                          Clusters
Variable                        1                        2                         3                         4
                          ‘Little Support’     ‘Objective 1’  ‘Objective 2 & 5b’  ‘Intermediate’
No. of regions        19                   34              10          40
Agriculture –0.74 1.05 –0.47 –0.38
Manufacturing 0.51 –0.61 0.99 0.14
Unemployment –0.49 0.45 0.33 –0.35
Infrastructure 1.53 –0.64 –0.11 –0.20
Obj. 1 support –0.63 1.21 –0.55 –0.59
Obj. 2 support –0.21 –0.48 2.62 –0.12
Obj. 5b support –0.40 –0.48 0.94 0.39
Population density 0.39 –0.25 –0.23 –0.23
GDP per capita 1.10 –1.03 –0.09 0.33
R&D 1.42 –0.82 –0.25 0.08631
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III. Economic Growth, Innovation Diffusion and Regional Support
Any explanation of growth differences needs theoretical underpinning. Eco-
nomic analyses of differences in growth across countries or regions have mostly
been based on one of two perspectives. The first, based on the traditional
neoclassical theory of economic growth (Solow, 1956), relies on the assump-
tion that technology is a public good, available to anyone free of charge. This
perspective puts the emphasis on capital accumulation as the main vehicle for
reducing differences in productivity across countries or regions. Moreover,
this is assumed to happen more or less automatically, as long as markets are
allowed to work freely. The other, competing, perspective puts the main em-
phasis on innovation and diffusion of technology as the driving force behind
differences in growth (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Fagerberg, 1987; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1995, ch. 8). This perspective is based on a totally different
view of technology, emphasizing its public as well as private character, and
the complementarities with other factors affecting the growth process. This
leads to the hypothesis that, without the ability to develop such complemen-
tary factors, countries or regions are likely to fall behind rather than catch up.
Previous research has shown that the predictions of the traditional neo-
classical model do not fit regional growth very well (see, e.g., Sala-i-Martin,
1996). Moreover, the assumption of technology as a (global) public good
does not carry much empirical support or intuitive appeal. On the contrary,
decades of empirical research on the creation and diffusion of technology
within and across country borders has shown that technology is often a very
local affair, embedded in firms, clusters of firms, regions and countries (Dosi,
1988). Although diffusion may – and does – take place, successful cases nor-
mally involve a host of other, supporting factors (Fagerberg, 1994). These are
facts that any theory that wants to throw light on the convergence–divergence
phenomenon has to account for.
In previous work we have analysed differences in growth performance
with the help of a so-called ‘technology-gap model’ (Fagerberg, 1987, 1988;
Verspagen, 1991). This model, based on the second of the two perspectives
outlined above, focuses on the impact of differences across countries in inno-
vative efforts, the potential for imitation and the capacity to exploit advances
in technology for differences in growth performance. This approach, based
essentially on Schumpeterian thinking,11 is consistent with the existing knowl-
11 Although Schumpeter did not extend his analysis of innovation diffusion to the international economy,
this seems to be quite a  natural extension to make. Indeed, the so called ‘neo-technological’ trade theories
 of the 1960s were heavily inspired by Schumpeter (Posner, 1961; Vernon, 1966). More recent analyses
of international economic developments drawing on Schumpeterian insights can be found in Dosi et al.
(1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991). For a discussion of the link between Schumpeter’s work and
post-war theoretical and applied work on growth and trade, see Fagerberg (2002, Introduction).632 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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edge on innovation and diffusion processes. Many of the assumptions and
derived predictions can also be made consistent with ‘new growth theories’
that focus on innovation diffusion as the driving force of capitalist develop-
ment (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Empirical work on cross-
country samples based on this perspective confirms the importance of na-
tional technological capabilities (and other supporting factors) for successful
catch-up (for overviews, see Fagerberg, 1994, 2002b). Thus, real world catch-
up is far from the easy, mechanical process envisaged by the traditional neo-
classical approach in this area.
What we will do in the following is to apply this perspective to regional
growth rate differences within Europe.12 Assume that the level of productiv-
ity in a region (Q) is a multiplicative function of the level of knowledge dif-
fused to the region from outside (D), the level of knowledge created in the
region (N), the region’s capacity for exploiting the benefits of knowledge
independently of where it is created (C), and a constant (Z):
Q = ZDαNβCτ, where Z is a constant  (1)
By differentiating and dividing through by Q, letting lower-case letters de-
note growth rates:
q = αd + βn + τc (2)
Assume further, as is common in the diffusion literature, that the diffusion of
external knowledge follows a logistic curve. This implies that the contribu-
tion of diffusion of externally available knowledge to economic growth is an
increasing function of the distance between the level of knowledge appropri-
ated in the region and that of the region on the technological frontier (for the
frontier region, this contribution will be zero). Let the total amount of knowl-
edge, adjusted for differences in size of regions, in the frontier region and the
region under consideration be Tf and T, respectively:
d = µ – µ (T / Tf) (3)
By substituting (3) into (2) we finally arrive at:
q = αµ – αµ (T / Tf) + βn + τc (4)
Hence, following this perspective, regional growth may be seen as the out-
come of three sets of factors:
• the potential for exploiting knowledge developed elsewhere (diffusion);
• creation of new knowledge in the region (innovation); and
• complementary factors affecting the ability to exploit the potential en-
tailed by knowledge independently of where it is created.
12 The presentation of the model draws on Fagerberg (1988).633
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There are two major challenges when applying this perspective. The first
has to do with finding indicators of innovation and the potential for diffusion,
the second with identifying and measuring the ‘complementary factors’. For
innovation we use R&D intensity, defined as business enterprise R&D per-
sonnel as a percentage of total employment.13 We expect a positive impact of
this variable. For diffusion potential we use, as is customary in the literature,
the initial level of GDP per capita in the region (log-form). The higher this
level, the smaller the scope for imitating more advanced technologies devel-
oped elsewhere. Hence, the expected impact of this variable is negative. Re-
garding complementary factors, there are many candidates that can be de-
fended theoretically and that we would have liked to take into account, from
variables related to various types of investments (education, infrastructure
and physical capital) to structural factors of various sorts. However, data are
scarce, especially among the former.
The ‘complementary’ variables that we were able to take into account were
as noted:
• physical infrastructure (kilometres of motorways per square kilometre);
• population density (the number of inhabitants per square kilometre);
• industrial structure (the shares of employment in agriculture and industry,
respectively, in total employment);14 and the
• long-term unemployment (that is, duration of more than one year, as a
share of the total labour force).
Among these, we would expect the first two to have a positive impact on
technology diffusion, since both a more developed infrastructure and a higher
population density increase the profitability/reduce the cost of introducing
new technology. Regarding industrial structure, it is one of the standard re-
sults in the existing empirical literature on regions that this is of significance.
In particular, a high reliance on agriculture has been shown to be detrimental
to regional growth (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996), among other things be-
cause of low technological opportunities and slow growth of the market. On
the share of ‘industry’ in total employment, the expectations are less clear.
Traditionally this sector – particularly manufacturing – has been regarded as
an ‘engine of growth’ (Kaldor, 1967). However, technological progress in
recent decades has been more geared towards services than industry, and many
13 All data for the variables described below are taken from the Eutostat Regio database and measured mid-
period (1990). In some cases, missing data were filled in by interpolation. R&D data for the UK in the first
period were estimated on the basis of less aggregated data from that period and a regional breakdown from
a later year. Regions with zero R&D in the second period and no account for the first period were assumed
to have zero R&D in that period as well.
14 Industry as used here includes fuel and power, manufacturing and construction. The remaining part of
total employment when agriculture and industry are deducted is services, which therefore cannot be
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traditional industries have been characterized by slow growth. Finally we in-
clude the level of unemployment as a possible complementary factor. We
interpret this as a measure of the cohesion of the broader social and economic
system in the region. The higher the share of the labour force that is excluded
from work on a long-term basis, the less well this system works. Hence it is
an indicator of institutional failure, and as such it might be expected to have a
negative impact on growth. For instance, it may hamper inflows of risk capi-
tal and qualified people, and encourage outflows, as empirical research in
this area indeed suggests (Fagerberg et al., 1997). Long-term unemployment
also leads to degradation of skills and lack of learning by doing in parts of the
workforce.
To this framework we then add the regional support from the EU as an-
other possible growth-inducing factor. Such support has both a short-run (de-
mand) and a long-run (supply) effect. While the former occurs more or less
instantaneously, the latter may take several years to materialize. Since it is the
latter that is of interest here, we have designed the test in a way that is consist-
ent with relatively long lags between the investment and its economic ef-
fects.15 However, as noted previously, the way in which this support is allo-
cated to regions poses a problem for the estimation. As pointed out in Section
II, the most important form of support (objective 1 support) is allocated to
regions on the basis of GDP per capita, which is also one of our explanatory
variables. In addition, objective 2 support is allocated partly on the basis of
unemployment rates, while objective 5b support is allocated partly on the
basis of the share of employment in agriculture. Again, both variables are part
of our set of explanatory variables. Thus it comes as no surprise that the three
forms of European regional support are closely correlated with various struc-
tural characteristics of regions, among which are the main variables of inter-
est in our empirical model as set out above (Table 4).
As the table shows, it is the close relation between European structural
funds, on the one hand, and GDP per capita and the share of agriculture in
15 In both periods we use data for regional support from the first half of the period, 1980–84 and 1989–
93, as independent variables.
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients between Selected Explanatory Variables in our
Model for the Period 1989–97
                                               European Support       GDP per Capita,         Long-term
                                                     (% of GDP)               1989   Unemployment, 1989
GDP per capita, 1989 –0.79
Long-term unemployment, 1989 0.11 –0.31
Share of agriculture, 1989 0.81 –0.73 0.04635
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employment, on the other hand, which is most likely to pose problems in the
estimation. The implication is that, due to this high degree of correlation, it
may be difficult to separate econometrically – especially in a cross-sectional
dimension – the effect on regional growth from, say, a high potential for tech-
nology diffusion (low level of GDP per capita) from a high level of EU sup-
port (similarly for EU support and the share of agriculture in total employ-
ment). To minimize these problems, we exploit the fact that important changes
have been going on over time in some of the dimensions taken into account
by the analysis, particularly in the working and coverage of EU regional sup-
port. Hence what we do in the regression analysis is to pool the data for the
period 1989–97 (after the reform) with the ones for the previous period 1980–
88. To allow for changes in the working of the variables between the two
periods, we introduce a first-period ‘time-slope dummy’ (TSD) for each inde-
pendent variable of the model. However, although we started out with time-
slope dummies for all variables, only the ones that contribute to the explana-
tory power (reduce the residual variance) of the model were retained in the
final reporting (using the general to specific method).
As is customary in analyses on pooled cross-country time-series datasets,
we report regressions both with and without country-specific constant terms
(‘country dummies’) in the regressions. The interpretations of the tests differ
slightly, however, depending on whether these country-specific factors are
allowed for or not. The first (including country-specific constant terms) is
equivalent to testing the explanatory power of the model for the differences
in growth across regions within each country (leaving the cross-country dif-
ferences to the country-specific terms), while the second (a common constant
term) implies a test of the explanatory power of our model on regional growth
in Europe as a whole (irrespective of country borders).
IV. Results
The results of the econometric analysis are presented in Table 5. As can be
seen from the R2, the model presented explains regional growth well, but the
version that allows for country-specific factors is clearly superior to the one
without, and will be preferred in the following. However, most estimates are
robust to the inclusion of country dummies. The main exception is the potential
for catch-up (initial GDP per capita) which is much lower when country
specific factors are included. By inspection of the estimated country dummies,
we observe that there are three countries with growth rates that deviate from
the average: Portugal and Spain grow significantly faster, and France grows a
lot more slowly than the others. This means that when country-specific factors
are included, the catch-up of Portuguese and Spanish regions towards the636 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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Table 5: Explaining Regional Growth, European Regions, 1980–97*
                                             Large Sample            Large Sample             Small Sample
                                            without Country          with Country              with Country
                                                 Dummies               Dummies              Dummies
Constant 0.060
(5.79)
Initial GDP per capita –0.017 –0.0097 –0.0084
(4.87) (2.73) (1.87)
Initial–TSD 0.0033 0.0044 0.0057
(3.43) (5.43) (6.30)
Agriculture –0.030 –0.035 –0.023
(3.65) (4.05) (1.45)
Manufacturing –0.0087 –0.024 –0.027
(0.95) (3.03) (3.30)
Infrastructure 0.0011 0.00044 0.00091
(2.77) (1.16) (2.63)
Infrastructure–TSD –0.0017 –0.0017 –0.0019
(3.08) (3.80) (5.29)
Unemployment –0.00059 –0.00074 –0.0011
(2.91) (3.36) (3.51)
Unemployment–TSD 0.00080 0.00072 0.00072
(3.70) (3.86) (2.11)
Population density 0.0015 0.00065 –0.00058
(1.59) (0.77) (0.67)
R&D 0.0010 0.0029 0.0022
(0.64) (1.94) (1.73)
EU support 0.0057 0.0046 0.0068
(5.36) (4.87) (3.24)


















Country dummies                     No                    Yes                   Yes
Adjusted R2 0.483 0.910 0.924
N                                     190                    190                   128
Note: *t–statistics in brackets.637
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European average is explained by these factors, rather than the potential for
catch-up.16
As previously, we report results (for our preferred model) for two different
samples, a large sample, identical to what we previously called ‘actual sam-
ple’, and a somewhat smaller sample excluding the three southern countries
that joined the community in the 1980s. Generally, the results are quite robust
to changes in the composition of the sample. This increases our confidence in
the results. However, although the difference across the two samples is small
in qualitative terms, there are some differences in the size and significance of
the individual coefficients. This holds, in particular, for infrastructure, unem-
ployment and EU support, all of which had a larger impact in the smaller
sample. The latter may indicate that EU support is more efficient in ‘advanced’
regions. This would not be totally unexpected, since these regions may be
assumed to have more developed ‘social capabilities’ (Abramovitz, 1994).
 Concentrating on the larger of the two samples (and the version with coun-
try dummies) we see that, in the second period, all variables have the ex-
pected signs, and that the estimates in all but two cases (‘infrastructure’ and
‘population density’) are significantly different from zero at conventional sig-
nificance levels. This also includes EU regional support. The first period is a
bit messier, however. First, the estimated effect of the scope for diffusion –
measured by the initial level of GDP per capita – is appreciably smaller. Sec-
ond, among the complementary variables, ‘unemployment’ ceases to have a
significant impact (with an estimate close to zero) while ‘infrastructure’ turns
up as significant and wrongly signed. Third, and most interesting from the
perspective of this article, the evidence of a positive impact of EU regional
support is much weaker in the first period. This pattern is in fact even more
pronounced for the smaller sample, for which there appears to be no evidence
at all for a positive effect of regional support during the 1980s.
 Thus, there appears to be evidence of a change in how European regional
support schemes affect regional growth. To get a grasp of the quantitative
effect of this, we calculated how our preferred model would explain the dif-
ference in growth performance between the three poorest and the three rich-
est regions of our (large) sample. The calculation showed that, in the first
period, differences in regional support contributed slightly less than 0.2 per
cent to the observed difference in growth. In the second period this contribu-
tion had grown to about 1.0 per cent, a sizeable increase.17 Although some of
16 Arguably, this does not constitute much of an explanation. And it certainly does not rule out the fact that
the potential for catch-up was important for Portuguese and Spanish growth in this period. But it shows
that there must be some other unidentified country-specific factors at work. For instance, why (until very
recently) was poor Greece not doing better?
17 Note that this estimate is likely to include the effects of matching funds as well, since these are nearly
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this has to do with the general increase in the amount of regional support, and
with the fact that some of the poorest regions in our sample received no sup-
port at all in the first half of the 1980s, an important share of this increase no
doubt stems from the fact that the estimated coefficient is so much higher in
the most recent period.
How sensitive is this result to changes in the set-up of the test? We con-
ducted a whole battery of tests, some of the most interesting of which are
reported in Table 6. First we tested for a change in the length of our two time
periods by moving the dividing year back or forward.18 There were some
differences in the size and significance of the individual coefficients across
the various regressions, but the qualitative result, a significant, positive im-
pact of EU regional support (particularly in the second period), remained the
same. Then we tested for the inclusion of a period-specific constant term to
take into account the possibility of, say, changes in the macroeconomic cli-
mate (or a common shock) from one period to the next (Table 6a). This possi-
bility did not receive much support, however, since the estimated period dum-
mies were not significant at conventional levels in any of the tests. But, for
the larger sample, the inclusion of this dummy variable had the effect of re-
ducing the impact of the time-series dummy for EU support, which now lost
much of its significance. The impact of EU support also became slightly lower.
However, these changes did not carry over into the smaller sample, which
yielded estimates more in line with the base regressions (Table 5).
18 The regressions with a longer second period tended to yield higher estimates for the impact of EU
support, while those with a shorter second period returned estimates roughly equal to the base regression
reported in Table 5. In both cases there was a marked difference in the efficiency of the support between
the two periods (with a significantly lower impact in the first period). However, the explanatory power was
higher in the base regression, implying that the division made fits the data rather well.
Table 6: Additional Tests*
                           (a) Including a Period Dummy              (b) Demand-adjusted GDP
          Large Sample         Small Sample        Large Sample       Smaller Sample
EU support 0.0037 0.0070 0.0038 0.0067
(2.55) (3.31) (4.03) (3.15)
EU-Tsd –0.0016 –0.011 –0.0017 –0.0098
(0.89) (2.50) (1.46) (2.27)
Period dummy –0.012 0.018
(0.73) (1.017)
Country dummies  Yes                  Yes                 Yes                 Yes
Adjusted R2 0.910 0.924 0.908 0.924
N                190                  128                 190                 128
Note: *t–statistics in brackets.639
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Next we asked to what extent the reported results are affected by not tak-
ing into account the substantial increase in support from 1994 onwards (Fig-
ure 1). Although it is unlikely that this increase would lead to substantial
supply effects in such a short time-span, it certainly has a demand effect. If
the long-run supply effects and the short-run demand effects are correlated,
as may be likely, there is a risk that we overestimate the long-run supply
effect. To check for this, we did the following experiment. Based on existing
macroeconomic evidence19 we adjust the level of GDP in the regions down-
wards by subtracting the (estimated) demand effect from European regional
support in the final year (1997).20 The result of the experiment is reported in
Table 6b. Again the small sample results are in line with the base regression
(Table 5). For the large sample, the numerical values of the estimate for EU
support are (as in the previous case) slightly lower than in the base regression
(Table 5). Moreover, the estimated value of the time-series dummy for EU
support is lower and less significant (though it is still significantly different
from zero at the 15 per cent level). Our interpretation of this is that the quali-
tative findings reported earlier are supported, but it points to a possible differ-
ence between the two samples. For the more developed member countries,
there is very clear evidence of a change in the efficiency of the support. When
the new, poorer member countries that joined during the 1980s are included
into the investigation, overall efficiency drops and the evidence of a change
in the impact weakens.
Conclusion
In previous work we have demonstrated that the process of regional conver-
gence that characterized most of the Member States of the European Union
from the 1950s onwards came to an end around 1980 and that there has, in
general, been little change since then. To the extent that there has been any
tendency towards convergence, it has been at the country level, related to
catch-up by the relatively poor southern countries that joined the EU during
the 1980s. Hence, it appears that these countries, particularly Portugal and
Spain, have benefited a good deal from their integration into the European
19 The available evidence comes from the national level, and is based on different methods/models. Our
reading of the evidence is that a short-run demand multiplier of unity seems to be an acceptable assumption
(Honohan, 1997; Commission, 2001). What we do is to apply this to the regional level. It is possible that
this is an overestimation, since import shares are certainly  higher at the regional than at the national level.
20 Ideally we would have done the same for the last year of the preceding period, but since we do not have
a complete regional breakdown of the support for that year, this was not possible. However, since support
was so much lower in the first period, the possible ‘error’ of not doing it is likely to be small.640 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN
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Union.21 Within countries, however, there has at best been a standstill. This
article, presenting new and more recent evidence, confirms these trends.
A particularly challenging question is, to what extent regional support from
the European Union, designed to foster growth and convergence and improve
social cohesion, has had a real impact on this situation. In previous work we
have faced great problems in finding convincing evidence for assuming a
positive effect, as intuition indeed would suggest (Fagerberg and Verspagen,
1996; Cappelen et al., 1999). In recent years – following the reforms – this
support has increased in importance, and it is thus natural to ask what are the
consequences of such support. The evidence presented in this article suggests
that EU regional support through the structural funds has a significant and
positive impact on the growth performance on European regions and, hence,
contributes to greater equality in productivity and income in Europe.22 These
findings, although based on different data and methods, support the conclu-
sions reached in Commission (2001). Moreover, there is evidence, particu-
larly for the more developed parts of the EU, of a change in the impact of the
support in the 1990s, indicating that the 1988 reform may have succeeded in
making EU regional policy more effective. This may certainly be seen as
comforting news for European policy-makers.
However, it needs to be emphasized that there are also other factors that
have to be taken into account. First, there is clear evidence suggesting that the
economic effects of regional support are much stronger in more developed
environments. This suggests that the impact of such support is crucially de-
pendent on the receptiveness of the receiving environment. Hence, it seems
that support is least efficient where it is most needed. This throws some doubt
on the validity of optimistic estimates, reached with the help of general mac-
roeconomic simulation models, of the impact of support in poorer member
countries in the south (Commission, 2001). Moreover, the estimates obtained
for the empirical growth model used in this article suggest that growth in
poorer regions is greatly hampered by an unfavourable industrial structure
(dominated by agriculture) and lack of R&D capabilities. Thus, an important
21 This may be interpreted as good news for the eastern European countries that are in the process of
becoming members. Note, however, that the performance of Greece until very recently has been much less
impressive.
22 Another recent study, based on a sample of 185 NUTS II regions between 1980 and 1996, concludes
otherwise: ‘The substantial public resources funnelled by the community to less developed regions do not
enhance the capacity of these regions … . Instead, they simply redistribute income’ (Boldrin and Canova,
2001, p. 211). This conclusion is based on the finding, reported by several studies (see Section I), of little
(if any) recent convergence in income per capita across European regions. However, since this outcome
may be affected by a host of other factors (in addition to regional support), it cannot be taken as direct
evidence of policy ineffectiveness. To assess the impact of regional support on growth, one needs to
control for other growth-enhancing (or retarding) factors. Moreover, the study fails to take into account
the possibility of a shift in policy effectiveness during the period, related to the substantial overhaul of the
system for regional support in 1988.641
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policy conclusion of the present exercise is that to get the most out of the
support, this needs to be accompanied by policies that improve the compe-
tence of the receiving environments, for instance by facilitating structural
change and increasing R&D capabilities in poorer regions.23 Such policies
must necessarily be of a long-term nature.
Appendix: Regions in the Samplea
NUTS             Name                                    NUTS                  Name




























es12 Principado de Asturias
es13 Cantabria
es21 Pais Vasco
es22 Comunidad Foral de Navarra
es23 La Rioja
es24* Aragon
es3 Comunidad de Madrid







es62 Region de Murcia
es63 Ceuta y Melilla
es7 Canarias








23 Interestingly, a recent empirical study of the effects of EU regional support on the pattern of
specialization of member countries (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002), suggests that such support
has made the recipient countries and regions better equipped to attract and absorb R&D-intensive industry.
Although the authors of that study express some reservation against their findings, because it works against
the so-called ‘principle of comparative advantage’ (according to which less-developed regions should
specialize in low-skill activities), from our perspective it would be interpreted as an indication of policy
effectiveness.642 AADNE CAPPELEN, FULVIO CASTELLACCI, JAN FAGERBERG AND BART VERSPAGEN












































uk2 Yorkshire and Humbershire
uk3 East Midlands
uk4 East Anglia
uk5 South East (UK)
uk6 South West (UK)
uk7 West Midlands




Note: a 10 of these, marked with *, are not included in the actual sample (used in the regression
analysis) due to the lack of data for certain variables and years.
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